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Visible Counterterrorism Measures in Urban Spaces—Fear-Inducing or Not?

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Many scholars working within the tradition of critical studies are sceptical of the presence of visible security measures in urban spaces, arguing that they cause fear and facilitate the political control of citizens. A study carried out in Denmark in 2011 sought to capture, describe, and rank factors impacting positively or negatively on the feelings of safety of Danish citizens, when being in a crowded place. Surprisingly, the response to security measures like fences, cameras, and uniformed guards was positive. More visible security apparently reinforced feelings of safety. This article discusses the findings and points to, amongst others, a high level of societal trust as one possible explanation.

Keywords citizens' attitudes, counterterrorism, fear, trust, visible security

Introduction

Visible, protective security measures—fences, bollards, screening check-points, cameras, and uniformed guards—around potential targets of terrorist attacks are becoming an ever more common feature of the urban landscapes of the world's major cities. While some analysts and commentators emphasize the necessity of such measures in light of the continued threat from terrorism, others, particularly scholars working

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within or inspired by critical studies, are highly sceptical. Visible security measures, the critics argue, create undue anxiety by constantly reminding the public of a (presumed) serious threat from terrorism. The main purpose of visible security measures, the argument goes, is not to protect citizens, but instead to control them through a manipulation of threat perceptions—by creating and exploiting fear to legitimize government control, counterterrorism measures, and spending.[1]

The argument that visible security measures create anxiety by making people think about threats, while intuitively plausible, is most frequently assumed rather than tested. This article is based on a study commissioned by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) together with TrygFonden,[2] and is designed to capture, describe, and rank factors and measures, including visible protective security measures, with an impact on the feelings of safety and security of Danish citizens when being in a crowded place. The study was carried out independently from the commissioning organisations by the consulting and research company Relation-Lab, and overseen by a scientific review board.[3]

The initial understanding was that highly visible security measures in and around crowded places would probably impact negatively on feelings of safety and security and that an effort to enhance security without undermining the public's sense of safety and security would have to rely on less visible means. The emerging data, however, was surprising: Visible security measures apparently made people feel safer. And this result could not be explained by a high degree of fear of terrorism—a majority of respondents expressed only moderate or no concern with the threat from terrorism. The study also revealed an unexpectedly broad range and high number of "soft" factors with a strong, positive impact on respondent's feelings of safety and security when being in a crowded place. They included the notion that society in general is inclusive, that minorities are respected, that society is characterized by a strong civic ethos, and that fundamental rights are protected. These topics and concerns are rarely included in the calculus by traditionally minded security sector actors and in the public and academic debate; they are frequently presented and debated as values at risk of being traded off to achieve higher levels of security against a threat from terrorism.[4]

This article presents, discusses, and offers possible interpretations of the results of the study. It opens with an outline of the criticisms raised against the use of visible protective security measures as part of counterterrorism. It then turns to the study, the research design, methods, limitations, and results with a focus on the unexpected findings. The article closes with a discussion of possible interpretations and implications of the data, pointing out that the high level of trust characterizing Danish society, combined with a high degree of support for the welfare state and for a preventive and not just punitive approach to crime-fighting, might account for the unexpected results.

Protective Security Measures—Ineffective and Fear-Inducing?

While few disagree that the aesthetic impact of fences, cameras, and jersey walls is negative, other aspects of urban protective security measures have been much debated.

It is difficult to find outright proponents of relying mainly on protective measures for counterterrorism. Yet, the notion that the built environment can help protect against crime is well established. Oscar Newman's 1972 study of crime and architecture in New York, *Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City*, argued that crime could, to some extent, be designed out via specific architectural means. Newman argued that real and symbolic barriers, creating defined areas of

influence, opportunities for surveillance, and various architectural means of extending the private into the public realm would combine to deter criminals and enhance citizens' willingness to take responsibility for the security of the public space.[5]

Newman's study generated significant amounts of follow-on research and debate, much of it critical. Amongst others, it has been argued that the focus on crime and insecurity has contributed to creating undue urban fear, while draining the city of one of its essences—a celebration of the variety and differences—by focusing attention on security risks often embodied in different-looking people or behaviour.[6]

The critical voices have multiplied in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the increasing introduction of visible security measures in cities and urban spaces that followed.

Some critics dispute the effectiveness and efficiency of protective measures, pointing out that they are expensive, but effective only when it comes to a few out of many possible threat manifestations. Vehicle mitigation measures, for example, do nothing to protect against attack by aircraft or suicide bombers wearing explosive belts, they argue.[7] Protective measures might convey a false sense of safety and security if the public is not aware of these limitations, it is argued, and rely on them as markers of safe spaces.[8] Other critics point out how a necessarily selective implementation of security measures around some, but not all, sites and buildings, creates differentiated zones of risk and security and thus reinforces segregation between privileged and less privileged city dwellers.[9]

Scholars and analysts working within or inspired by critical studies or critical terrorism studies have been particularly vocal critics.[10] Critical studies advance a research agenda based on the assumption that knowledge including narratives and notions about terrorism is socially constructed, and that there is a need for scholars to confront dominant notions of the magnitude of the risk of terrorism.[11] They point to a disproportionate relationship between the forceful societal reactions to terrorism, including increased use of visible security measures, and the low statistical risk of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack.[12] Some point to impersonal forces like globalisation, breakdown of universal values, existential insecurity, a general feeling of loss of control, and resulting efforts to seek to restore a measure of a feeling of control and certainty as drivers of the increased reliance on visible security measures.[13] But the general thrust of the argument of critical scholars is that powerful economic and political elites are well served by the focus on fear and the possibility of marketing security solutions to an almost limitless number of potential at-risk targets in cities and urban spaces.[14] Visible security measures, it is argued, are in reality not there to protect citizens, but instead to control them through a manipulation of threat perceptions.[15]

The argument that visible security measures increase insecurity[16] and cause fear finds some empirical support in a 2005 study from the University of Florida. The study exposed respondents to a mock newspaper headline warning of a terrorist attack, and after that to photos of visible security measures like armed security personnel, cameras, and razor wire fences as well as less visible security measures such as planters doubling as bollards. The study indicated that the visible security measures and armed guards in particular, as opposed to the less visible, provoked feelings of suspiciousness, tenseness, and fear.[17]

A qualitative Australian study from 2010 indicated that reactions to security measures introduced by the government, e.g., security measures at airports, were mixed—to some providing reassurance and confidence, to others the opposite. However, for the latter the discomfort was not due to the fact that the visible measures

reminded them of the threat from terrorism, but rather due to the fact that the measures were seen as an expression of a culture of paranoia. Thus, the respondents seem to have reasoned more along the lines of critical scholars than along the lines of fearful (and possibly manipulated) citizens.[18]

In sum, the empirical evidence showing that visible security measures provoke anxiety is limited and mixed. Most frequently, the fear-inducing effect is assumed rather than tested in the critical literature.[19]

The Study: Which Factors Contribute Positively or Negatively to Danish Citizens' Feelings of Safety and Security When Frequenting a Crowded Place?

The study commissioned by TrygFonden and PET was designed to seek to capture and describe factors impacting on the feelings of safety and security of Danish citizens when frequenting a place that could potentially be the target of a terrorist attack, to cluster and rank these factors, and to seek to gauge the extent to which the preconditions for feeling safe and secure were, in the opinion of the sample population, accommodated.

Accordingly, the study was carried out in four steps. In Step 1, qualitative methods were used to identify and describe general notions of and factors connected to feelings of safety and security. In Step 2, a quantitative survey with 2,000 respondents tested, clustered, and ranked the identified factors and conceptions of safety and security. Step 3 sought to measure to what extent the respondents' preconditions for feeling safe and secure were perceived by the respondents to be fulfilled—their performance perception. Finally, in a fourth step, the study identified three partially overlapping segments among the respondents. The three segments had a common core of needs, perceptions, and preferences, but also some different needs in terms of preconditions for feeling safe and secure.

Step 1: Focus Group Interviews

In Step 1, two three-hour focus group interviews with respectively ten and eleven participants of mixed ages, gender, and ethnicity were conducted in the two largest cities in Denmark. The purpose was to gain qualitative insights into conceptions of security and safety of Danish citizens. The interviews were carried out by an experienced psychologist as outlined by a written questionnaire guide using laddering.[20] During the first hour, participants were asked to talk about what made them feel safe or unsafe in the city spaces. During the second hour, the topic of terrorism was introduced and the interview focused on terrorism and its effect on their feelings of safety and security. At the beginning of the third hour, the participants were told that the survey was commissioned by the police.[21] During the third hour, they were presented with images of visible security measures and built-in, less visible security measures and again asked how these measures affected their feelings of safety and security. The presented security measures were surveillance cameras, metal detectors, waist and full-height turnstiles, unarmed guards with or without uniform and/or dogs, natural and artificial fences, traditional and architectural bollards, and glazing.[22]

One of our initial concerns was that the introduction of the themes of terrorism and counter-terrorism policing might skew the results by causing a fear mode amongst the respondents. In such a situation one might expect any security measure to be embraced, not because the measure in itself made respondents feel safer, but because it would be perceived as a way to reduce the immediate feelings of anxiety

that talk of terrorism might induce. Critical scholars, as discussed above, warn that the presence of visible security measures or any other physical or linguistic signifier of terrorism might be exploitable in terms of creating a more favourable attitude towards various counterterrorism initiatives.[23] The video transcripts, however, reveal no change in tone at the introduction of the topic of terrorism. Instead, the immediate reaction to the information that the police commissioned the study was a short discussion as to whether or not respondents should have participated for free as the study served a public purpose. A few participants would have participated without pay in such a situation. One possible interpretation as to why they would do this, as discussed further below, is that this should be seen in light of a generally high level of trust in Danish society, including a high degree of trust in government agencies.[24]

Based on the focus group interviews, Relation-Lab and the psychologist identified one hundred statements describing factors, measures, or preconditions contributing to making people feel safe—or, in case of their absence, less safe. These statements would later form the basis of the first quantitative survey. The statements identified were statements like *Uniformed police officers are visible in the streets, Ethnic minorities are respected in the community*, or *The most modern technology is used for preventive scanning of persons and luggage at major events*.

Most of the suggested statements were endorsed by the focus group participants as accurate depictions of their preconditions for feeling safe and secure. In some instances, one or more participants voiced reservations with regard to the content or wording of a statement. When this happened, the dissenter's point or objection was noted down and converted into an attitude statement, for example: *I do not think about terrorism, It is highly overestimated*, or *It is okay that the security service can track suspicious e-mails*. The attitude statements were included in the quantitative research in Steps 2 and 3 of the study to get a measure of the extent to which the reservations raised by individual members of the focus groups were shared by the sample population.

Step 2: Data Collection and Aggregation

In Step 2, a detailed 40-minute questionnaire was developed based on the statements identified in Step 1. The questionnaire was answered by 2,000 respondents, representative of the wider Danish population in terms of age, geography, ethnicity, social and marital status, etc. The purpose was to gauge the relative importance of the various statements formulated in Step 1 of the study. The respondents were first asked to what degree the various statements reflected factors, measures, or preconditions with an impact on their feelings of safety and security when being in crowded places.[25] The respondents were then asked to continuously remove five of ten rotating statements that were the least important to them. The statements were shown three times, but always in a new constellation, thus forcing the respondents to continuously remove statements in different contexts. The continuous rotation of statements and the de-selection method made it unlikely that any respondents would be able to consciously or unconsciously manipulate the results. Furthermore, the results were controlled for inconsistency. The final relative weighted importance of the individual statements was then rescaled to a ten-point scale.

Based on the respondents' selections and de-selections, the statements were grouped statistically using hierarchical clustering to find the statements that were interconnected. The hierarchical clustering was carried out to reduce the one

hundred statements to a more manageable number. The clustering revealed thirty-two interconnected groups of statements for which thirty-two aggregated statements were constructed. Thus an aggregated statement like *Effective integration policies, inclusive society, and mutual respect between ethnic and religious groups* was constructed to cover eight statements like *Ethnic minorities are respected in the society* and *We have a good and broad understanding of the various religious communities*.[26]

Finally, the respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the twenty attitude statements formulated on the basis of reservations or disagreement voiced in the focus group interviews. A scale from one to six was used.[27] As the respondents were asked the twenty questions one at a time, it is possible that the results could have been consciously or unconsciously manipulated by the respondents.

Step 3: Measuring Importance and Performance Perception

In Step 3, a second 40-minute questionnaire was developed to uncover to what extent the respondents felt that the thirty-two aggregated statements were already realized (thus contributing to feelings of safety and security) or not realized (thus potentially contributing to feelings of insecurity). This was done using a seven-point Likert scale. The results were then rescaled to a -3 to $+3$ scale. An importance score was calculated for the various aggregated statements and the individual rankings of the statements were compared using a discrete choice analysis.

Using the aggregated importance and performance perception score, a utility score was calculated. The utility score was in itself an artificial construct, but was intended to indicate which aggregated statements the respondents considered important but not fulfilled.

Step 4: Segmentation of Citizens

Finally, in a fourth step, hierarchical clustering was used to identify three partially overlapping segments of citizens with a core of identical preconditions for feeling safe and secure, but also some divergent needs and preferences. True outliers were removed when identified by at least two methods.[28] The following selection criteria were used to help in the identification of the segments: size, stability, identifiability, availability (in a marketing mix sense),[29] and behavioural traits.

Findings: Importance Scores

Table 1 below shows the importance score of the seventeen highest ranked aggregated statements, describing measures to support and preconditions for the respondents' feelings of safety and security.[30]

Of the seventeen statements, four aggregated statements stood out as more important than the others. The single most important was the presence of *Competent, professional, and efficient intelligence, police, and emergency management services* (Statement 1). This statement was an aggregation of statements covering both regular policing tasks and counterterrorism tasks.

Statements 2 and 4 were also aggregated from statements covering various counterterrorism policing and intelligence measures. Statement 3, *Non-threatening urban spaces*, was aggregated from statements about the urban spaces themselves like sufficient lighting and orderly and non-threatening conduct by the users.

Table 1. The seventeen most important aggregated statements

Statement	Importance (I)
1. Competent, professional, and efficient intelligence, police, and emergency management services	6.9
2. Effective police surveillance of militant extremists and potential terrorism targets (critical infrastructure)	6.1
3. Non-threatening urban spaces and immediate surroundings—well-lit and well-ordered public spaces like stations, streets, squares	6.0
4. Effective international police and intelligence cooperation	5.8
5. Effective efforts directed at preventing recruitment by extremist groups and protecting vulnerable youth from radicalization	5.4
6. Effective integration policies, inclusive society, and mutual respect between ethnic and religious groups	5.4
7. Robust security procedures at transportation hubs (screening, removal of left luggage, etc.)	5.1
8. Protection of fundamental rights	5.0
9. Society characterized by strong civic ethos	4.9
10. Clearly marked emergency exits and posted evacuation plans at crowded places	4.9
11. Citizens generally capable of helping each other with first aid in case of a crisis situation	4.9
12. Police communicate openly about the threat and authorities and civil society cooperate in order to prevent threats	4.9
13. Visible police presence in cities	4.9
14. Access control at major events	4.8
15. Police presence, guards, cameras, bomb-sniffing dogs, metal detectors at major events, transportation hubs, and other crowded places	4.7
16. Dialogue across political and religious divides	4.7
17. Security measures at buildings and crowded places	4.6

The rest of the seventeen aggregated statements were more or less equally important to the respondents. They were, however, very different in nature, covering "soft" issues like integration and dialogue, citizen's civic ethos and willingness to help each other, and early crime prevention measures as well as more classical "hard" policing and counterterrorism measures, protective measures and more.

Findings: Performance Perceptions and Utility

The third and fourth steps of the research sought to gauge the citizens' perceptions of to what extent the needs and preconditions expressed in the aggregated statements were fulfilled and sought to identify segments within the population, whose needs and preconditions might diverge.

Table 2 again shows the seventeen most important aggregated statements. However, in this table the respondents' performance perception score was added and the aggregated statements' utility score was calculated.[31]

Table 2. The seventeen most important aggregated statements with importance, performance perception, and utility scores

Statement	Importance score (I)	Performance perception score (P)	Utility score (U)
1. Competent, professional, and efficient intelligence, police, and emergency management services	6.9	0.5	3.4
2. Effective police surveillance of militant extremists and potential terrorism targets (critical infrastructure)	6.1	0.8	4.9
3. Non-threatening urban spaces and immediate surroundings—well-lit and well-ordered public spaces like stations, streets, squares	6.0	0.7	4.4
4. Effective international police and intelligence cooperation	5.8	1.4	8.2
5. Effective efforts directed at preventing recruitment by extremist groups and protecting vulnerable youth from radicalization	5.4	0.0	0.0
6. Effective integration policies, inclusive society, and mutual respect between ethnic and religious groups	5.4	−0.3	−1.6
7. Robust security procedures at transportation hubs (screening, removal of left luggage, etc.)	5.1	1.1	5.7
8. Protection of fundamental rights	5.0	0.8	4.2
9. Society characterized by strong civic ethos	4.9	0.6	3.0
10. Clearly marked emergency exits and posted evacuation plans at crowded places	4.9	0.4	2.4
11. Citizens generally capable of helping each other with first aid in case of a crisis situation	4.9	0.5	2.7
12. Police communicate openly about the threat and authorities and civil society cooperate in order to prevent threats	4.9	0.0	0.0
13. Visible police presence in cities	4.9	−0.2	−0.8
14. Access control at major events	4.8	−0.4	−1.7
15. Police presence, guards, cameras, bomb-sniffing dogs, metal detectors at major events, transportation hubs, and other crowded places	4.7	−0.6	−2.7

(*Continued*)

Table 2. *(Continued)*

Statement	Importance score (I)	Performance perception score (P)	Utility score (U)
16. Dialogue across political and religious divides	4.7	−0.2	−0.5
17. Security measures at buildings and crowded places	4.6	−0.6	−2.7

Eight aggregated statements had a utility score that was zero or negative and are marked with bold in the table above. A negative utility score indicates a perceived gap between the needs and preconditions expressed in the aggregated statements and what respondents apparently experienced when frequenting a crowded place. The negative utility score thus presumably indicates that the respondents' feelings of safety and security would be increased by adding more of the initiatives and measures described in the aggregated statement.

Half of the eight aggregated statements with a score of zero or below concerns the kind of visible protective security measures of which critical scholars are critical: 13. *Visible police presence in cities*; 14. *Access control at major events*; 15. *Police presence, guards, cameras, bomb-sniffing dogs, metal detectors at major events, transportation hubs, and other crowded places*; 17. *Security measures at buildings and crowded places*.[32] Others concern "soft" measures and initiatives to strengthen upstream, preventive efforts against extremism as well as inclusiveness and dialogue across religious, ethnic, or political divides in society. The utility scores of or below zero presumably indicate that the respondents would feel safe and secure to a higher degree if more protective, preventive, and dialogue-oriented initiatives were implemented.

Findings: Segments

In the final step, the study sought to identify possible divergences in needs structures across different groups of respondents. Three major segments with partially different needs structures were eventually identified.

The three segments had a common core of two highly ranked aggregated statements: 1. *Competent, professional, and efficient intelligence, police, and emergency management services* and 3. *Non-threatening urban spaces and immediate surroundings – well-lit and well-ordered public spaces like stations, streets, squares*. Two segments, which were labelled *Authority Focussed* and *Security Measure Oriented*, were quite alike but the Authority Focussed placed slightly more emphasis on the international aspects of intelligence work and the police's role while the Security Measure Oriented placed slightly more emphasis on the security measures themselves. The third segment differed significantly, with respondents showing a preference for aggregated statements emphasising intercultural understanding, integration, strong civic ethos, and protection of fundamental rights. This segment was labelled *Tolerance Seekers*. There were no significant demographic differences between the segments (see Figure 1).

When it came to visible security measures, a positive impact on feelings of safety and security emerged for two of the segments—authority focussed and security



Figure 1. Relative size of the three segments and the common core of needs.

measure oriented—accounting for 68 percent of the respondents. For the last segment, accounting for the remaining 32 percent of the respondents, the impact was neutral.

To test whether the aggregate data, which indicated quite positive attitudes towards strong policing measures, surveillance, etc., might hide underlying differences or contradictions between the segments, respondents were grouped according to which segment they belonged to on the attitude statements formulated in Step 1 of the study. This revealed differences, but no direct contradicting opinions between the segments. Figure 2 shows how all segments favoured or moderately favoured various policing and surveillance measures. One could speculate that while respondents might disagree as to how and under what circumstances surveillance should be implemented, they did agree that surveillance is an acceptable measure in the effort to keep crowded places safe and secure.

As mentioned above, one of our initial concerns was that talking about terrorism might put respondents in a fear mode, inclining them to be more accepting of

Figure 2. The segments' attitudes towards surveillance (on a six-point scale where 1 indicates the least and 6 the highest degree of agreement with the statement).



Figure 3. The segments' assessment of the threat level and concern over terrorism (on a six-point scale where 1 indicates the least and 6 the highest degree of agreement with the statement).

strong policing measures and various security measures than they would otherwise have been. Even if we could not register any overt signs of a fear mode in the video transcripts of the qualitative focus group interviews, participants did voice different opinions in terms of how much or how little the threat from terrorism meant to them in their everyday lives. Therefore it was decided to test the statements listed in Figure 3 below on the respondents in the quantitative survey.

The scoring in Figure 3 indicates that the respondents do perceive an increased threat from terrorism. However, we do not know from which baseline. The scoring on the two last statements seems to indicate that the respondents are not highly concerned with the threat: One segment—the Authority Oriented—might be characterized as moderately concerned. The two other segments are less concerned. The Tolerance Seekers are the least concerned.

It should be kept in mind that the level of concern was self-reported and it cannot be excluded that some respondents might have consciously or unconsciously over- or underestimated their degree of concern. However, the findings are concordant with other surveys and studies, also indicating that Danes in general feel safe and secure and rank the threat from terrorism relatively low on their list of concerns.[33] All in all, we find it reasonable to assume that the findings of the study were not systematically biased because the respondents' selections, de-selections, and responses were taking place while respondents were not in a fear mode.

Limitations

As already touched upon above, the study has a number of limitations. It has been pointed out that feeling safe and secure is actually not a feeling, but rather an absence of discomfort, anxiety, or feelings of insecurity.[34] Thus, trying to capture what makes people not feel anxiety is obviously not a straightforward task. The use of extensive focus group interviews to seek to approach and capture respondents' notions of safety and security were intended to ensure the validity of the measures constructed for the quantitative study. But admittedly, the transformation and distillation of notions of safety and security from the narrative form to a shorter form

suitable for quantitative studies was a challenge. The wording of a number of the highest ranked aggregate statements leaves a considerable margin for interpretation. What exactly do the respondents understand by terms such as "competent," "professional," and "effective" police and intelligence efforts? Do the respondents intend a classical "tough on crime" approach or rather a civil liberties-sensitive use of policing powers? In principle, the embrace of policing and intelligence measures to counter terrorism could comprise very different underlying conceptions of what exactly it is that is being embraced. Even if the underlying statements from which the aggregated statements are constructed are somewhat more specific, they still contain terms that are open for interpretation. What is clear from the study, considering the positive performance indicators, is that whatever the respondents understand by "competent" and "professional," the perception is that it is more or less accommodated as things are being handled today. In other words, if the results are taken to implicate that there is a general level of satisfaction with current Danish law enforcement and preparedness efforts as is, we should be on relatively safe ground. However, one should be careful about drawing conclusions about which specific interpretations of "professional" and "effective" policing and preparedness efforts the respondents favour more or less of.

Likewise, when the respondents via their scoring indicate that, for example, more "effective integration policies, inclusive society and mutual respect between ethnic groups" would enhance their perceptions of safety and security, the result may cover a range of different notions of what "effective," "inclusive," and "respect" entail. If one were to attempt to use the results as a basis for designing new integration policies with an eye to strengthening the perceptions of safety and security of Danish citizens, additional studies would have to be carried out to clarify which potentially different meanings respondents have attached to "effective" and "inclusive."

Turning to the wording of the statements that concern visible security measures—a central concern of the study—there is still room for interpretation. For example, when respondents indicate that they would prefer more "visible police presence in cities," this might cover different underlying notions of whether or not police should be armed, where they should be visible, and whether they should interact proactively with citizens or simply be a visible back-up. Respondents may also picture different things when indicating the importance of "clearly marked emergency exits and posted evacuation plans at crowded places" or "access control at major events." But in general, and maybe because the protective security measures represent a more palpable, less ambiguous category than complex categories such as counterterrorism policy and praxis and integration policy and praxis, the statements contain fewer concepts by which respondents might understand starkly different things. Thus, arguably, the validity of the measurement of the impact of feelings of safety and security of the visible security measures should be higher.

It is still important to keep in mind, though, that the study records self-reported perceptions of what contributes to or detracts from feelings of safety and security. It is possible that respondents are wrong about how different measures impact on their feelings and that a study that sought to track the physiological impact of being exposed to/confronted with some of the measures outlined in the study would yield different results. Future studies along those lines might help qualify or validate the findings of the Danish study.

At a more practical level, the research did not address the issue that the citizens' perceptions of what contributes to or detracts from security and safety could be

inaccurate—one of the fundamental concerns of critics of visible security measures is that since powerful actors have a political and economic interest in exaggerating not just the notion of a threat but also the effectiveness of marketable security solutions and control technologies, citizens are quite likely to be misled and to form inaccurate perceptions of what contributes to or detracts from security. Indeed, most social science approaches to studying risk and risk management would point out how cultural, social, and individual psychological predispositions and factors play a role and shape perceptions of risk and risk-reduction measures.[35] It is entirely possible that factors which independently minded construction engineers, experts in blast modelling, individuals with tactical military insights, experts in preparedness and emergency response, criminologists, or others would not consider of importance to the safety and security of citizens were considered important by the citizens themselves. For example, respondents in aggregated statement 13 request more *Visible police presence in cities*, a measure most police scientists do not consider particularly effective when it comes to preventing crime.[36] Likewise, it is possible that factors considered important by security experts are not perceived as such by the citizens. Glazing of windows to prevent flying glass splinters—the source of the vast majority of injuries resulting from bomb blasts in urban spaces—might be an example of one such measure. Performance perceptions might likewise be inaccurate.

Such limitations should be taken into account if seeking to transform the research results into policy recommendations. It goes without saying that from a security professional's standpoint, it is not advisable to implement protective security measures with no proven record of actually decreasing damage in case of an attack, even if the popular perception is that they are effective. Instead, an attempt to approach a more shared perception of risks and risk mitigation via dialogue between citizens, experts, and authorities could be attempted.[37] More of this type of open communication was actually requested by respondents according to aggregated statement 12, *Police communicate openly about the threat and authorities and civil society cooperate in order to prevent threats.*

Finally, it should be noted that the study's ontological and epistemological assumptions differ from the ontology, epistemology, and critical approach of some of the scholars who have been most vocal in their criticism of the increasing presence of visible security measures in urban spaces. At a fundamental level, critical scholars might reject that there is a reality of "feelings of safety and security" out there, independent of language, social interactions and, thus, research design, which can meaningfully be described and quantified, and thus might reject the validity of the research on which this article is based. Such a criticism pertaining to the fundamental choice of scientific vantage point is certainly possible, but not easy to address within the scope of this article. As pointed out earlier, we remain convinced that rigorous empirical research can yield valid insights and inform policy development in meaningful ways.

In sum, it is certainly possible to debate a number of the assumptions and aspects of the design as well as the wording and validity of some of the study's measures. One should be careful not to over-interpret the data or base unwarranted conclusions on it. A careful reading of the results, based on an awareness of the basic strengths and limits of the study's quantitative approach to capture feelings of safety and security, is necessary. Yet, as argued above, the key unexpected findings that visible security does not induce feelings of insecurity and that feeling secure while frequenting a potential target of terrorist attacks depends on a very broad set of

factors, including "soft" factors, do not seem fundamentally challenged by the limitations discussed above.

Discussion

The inquiry into citizens' perceptions of safety and security in crowded places and their preconditions for feeling safe and secure led to both expected and unexpected findings.

An effective law enforcement effort, whatever meanings might be attached to the term "effective" by respondents, is not surprisingly fundamental to people's feelings of safety and security and is a factor which has been identified also by other studies of perceptions of terrorism risk and security.[38]

Likewise, the importance of the appearance of the urban spaces themselves and the non-threatening conduct of their users is not surprising. The notion that people take cues from their immediate surroundings when they determine whether they feel secure or not is well established in theory and research: People read the environment as a barometer of risk and likelihood that others will intervene on their behalf. An orderly and well maintained environment contributes to feelings of safety. If, on the other hand, the physical environment is characterized by disrepair, graffiti, abandoned buildings, etc. people have been shown to perceive this as an indicator of a higher risk of victimisation regardless of what official crime statistics might say. Signs of decay apparently are being interpreted as signs of a neighbourhood out of control.[39] Other studies indicate that when neighbours are known and seen as supportive, fear is diminished even in areas with high statistical risk of crime, underlining the importance of other people to people's sense of security as well as the connection between strong communities, social capital, mutual trust, and feelings of safety and security.[40] Thus, the Danish respondents' emphasis on *well-lit and well-ordered public spaces like stations, streets, squares* is not surprising (and would also not be surprising to a critical scholar).

However, the study also contained a number of unexpected findings. Why do visible security measures contribute to rather than detract from feelings of safety and security? Why is the conception of safety and security when being in a crowded place so relatively broad, including questions of civic ethos, integration, and "soft" preventive activities? Why do strong policing measures and protection of fundamental rights both figure as important and as contributors to respondents' feeling of safety and security, despite much debate about a potential tension between the two?

Along the lines of the results from the University of Florida study, we expected that visible security measures would probably impact negatively on respondents' feelings of safety and security. Yet, we found that, for example, *Robust security procedures at transportation hubs (screening, removal of left luggage, etc.), Police presence, guards, cameras, bomb-sniffing dogs, metal detectors at major events, transportation hubs, and other crowded places*, etc. figured as measures with a positive impact on respondents' self-reported feelings of safety and security. We also found that half of the eight aggregated statements with a utility score of zero or below, shown in Table 2, concerned visible protective measures, indicating that respondents would welcome more of those initiatives and that they would, in principle, boost feelings of safety and security. While not the most important component in making respondents feel safe and secure, the results outlined in Tables 1 and 2 do seem to indicate that their impact is positive.

A critical reading of the findings might suggest that the security measures contribute to a superficial feeling of safety and security by relieving immediate anxiety, but still form part of an overall and self-sustaining threat discourse. It might further suggest that the Danish public is being manipulated into believing that the threat from terrorism is far greater than it actually is and/or into believing that protective measures are more effective than they actually are. The question whether the findings could be biased because respondents were in a fear mode—generally or in connection with replying—has been discussed above and we have argued that it does not seem to be the case. The Danish population is, according to the attitude statements of this study and according to other studies as well, only moderately concerned or unconcerned about the threat from terrorism. Moreover, the video transcripts from the focus group interviews do not reveal any change of tone at the introduction of the term "terrorism."

We suggest, instead, that the high level of societal trust, combined with a high level of trust in government authorities in Denmark might help explain these findings.

One possible explanation for the unexpectedly positive attitude towards visible protective security measures could be that people use their own everyday (and in Denmark mainly peaceful and unthreatening) experience as an indicator of how safe and secure their society is, rather than being impressed by dramatic media coverage of threats and crime.[41] This goes somewhat against the post-modernist/social constructivist view of risk, claiming that socially constructed hazards (or their physical expression in the form of visible protective security measures) have a major impact on people's risk perceptions.[42] Might the Danish public simply see protective measures as protective measures and not as something signalling danger? Such an interpretation would be concordant with the relatively low degree of the respondents' self-reported concern with the threat from terrorism.

A factor which might further contribute to explaining the findings could be the high level of trust in the authorities as well as the high level of trust in each other characterizing Danish citizens.[43] Whereas stronger law enforcement powers and visible security measures in lower-trust societies might provoke feelings of loss of control, tenseness, and even fear, the same measures might make people living in high-trust societies conclude that reasonable and generally trustworthy government authorities and/or owners and operators of crowded places have taken responsibility for reducing the risks connected to being in a crowded place. The high level of trust might also explain the strong support for and positive interpretation of the contribution of law enforcement and intelligence efforts. A Norwegian study from 2009 showed a very high degree of support for even quite intrusive law enforcement measures to combat terrorism—a result that was linked to high levels of social trust among the respondents.[44]

Thus, one possible reading could be that protective measures are conducive to feelings of safety and security, but only in a context where respondents have a high degree of trust in authorities and in each other—a belief that fellow citizens are reasonable and responsible and that government authorities are fair and not inclined to misuse powers. In this case, the arguments of the critics of visible security measures might still hold up in societies characterized by lower levels of trust than the Danish society.

Another unexpected result is the broad set of issues brought up by respondents. Keeping in mind that the respondents were being asked about their feelings of safety and security not in general, but when in a crowded place, it is interesting to note that "soft" issues like dialogue, integration, and citizens characterized by a strong civic

ethos figure prominently. Equal rights and freedom of speech also figured on the list of the17 top-ranked factors with an impact on feelings of safety and security when being in a crowded place. Looking at the findings summarized in Tables 1 and 2, it appears that respondents have a surprisingly and arguably nuanced, holistic, and long-term perception of what it takes to keep urban spaces safe.

One possible interpretation might point to the Danish welfare state tradition as well as the tradition for local, cross-governmental early preventive efforts to support and re-socialize youth who have started flirting with crime or with radical groups. The broad set of factors brought up by the respondents mirror this broad and inclusive preventive approach to a greater extent than a narrow and more punitive approach to crime fighting. One might also speculate that given that the respondents are relatively unconcerned with the threat from terrorism, they might also have other safety and security concerns in mind—ordinary crime and perceived lack of integration of minority groups—when selecting and de-selecting. If this is indeed the explanation and the respondents mainly have lesser threats and crimes in mind, it is worth noting that there is also and still a general acceptance of surveillance and strong policing powers. Again, the high degree of trust in authorities might be an important explanatory factor.

A high degree of trust might also help explain the final unexpected finding—that strong policing powers and strong protection of fundamental rights both figure as positive contributors to feelings of safety and security, despite much attention in the public, political, and academic debate to a potential trade-off between the two. In the study, well-resourced and effective counterterrorism efforts, including international intelligence cooperation and surveillance of militant groups, figure, together with protection of fundamental rights, as factors contributing positively to feelings of safety and security in crowded places. It should be cautioned, though, that the study represents a snapshot and does not track the dynamic development of the different factors. It is thus conceivable that if perceptions of the balance between the two were to shift significantly, they may stop figuring side by side as positive contributors. We cannot tell from the findings whether there is a positive or an inverse correlation between the two or if such a correlation might shift in other contexts.

Conclusion: Trust, Visible Security, and Counterterrorism

Many scholars and analysts working within or inspired by the tradition of critical studies are sceptical when it comes to the increasing presence of protective security measures in urban spaces. Visible security measures, the argument goes, serve as a reminder of a postulated ubiquitous threat from terrorism, cause fear, and facilitate the political control and manipulation of citizens. The study discussed in this article places a question mark on such arguments.

The study sought to capture, describe, and rank factors impacting positively or negatively on the feelings of safety and security of a representative sample of Danish citizens, when being in a crowded place. Surprisingly, it appeared that the response of an average Danish citizen, when confronted with visible security measures like fences, cameras, or uniformed guards, is actually positive.

It is frequently pointed out that effective counterterrorism requires a number of different initiatives including diplomacy, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, protective measures, and emergency response capabilities.[45] It is also frequently pointed out that almost every element of counterterrorism entails dilemmas and

trade-offs. Most measures, including protective security, have both costs and benefits.[46] Our findings do not challenge these overall insights.

Even if protective measures do not cause fear, they should never be applied uncritically and they could never stand alone. Downstream interception of threats by means of protective measures directly around the potential target leaves little margin of error and might be prohibitively expensive, given the number of potential targets. Protective measures that rely on limiting access and screening users of mass transit systems or public spaces such as city squares or other gathering places would obviously also seriously impair the functioning of these places and infrastructures. Yet, in light of the current and apparently increasing risk that 'lone wolf' terrorism goes undetected by classical intelligence and law enforcement measures all the way up to his or her point of attack, a selective implementation of protective measures around high value or particularly vulnerable targets is arguably prudent.

What our findings indicate is that the balance between costs and benefits of protective measures is likely to be very much dependent on the level of societal trust and trust in government authorities and that when such trust is present, the balance is more likely to be positive.

While our findings thus place a question mark at the assumptions of those who reject visible security measures on the grounds that they create anxiety, it also challenges the narrow, security-oriented perspective that sometimes characterizes security practitioners. In fact, the utility scores indicated that the greatest potential for enhancing feelings of safety and security amongst citizens transiting through, working, dining, or shopping in a crowded place is to work to strengthen those citizens' perception of living in an inclusive society with a strong civic ethos.

Some of what it would take to do so falls outside the remit of the agencies traditionally concerned with counterterrorism and to some extent outside of the remit of government authorities in general. Yet, the awareness of the presence of this broad set of preconditions for citizens feeling safe and secure is arguably central to balanced policy formulation and to counterterrorism praxis. The study in a sense provides empirical underpinnings to claims long forwarded by civil liberties advocates and other critics of relying only on a crime fighting or even a military approach to counterterrorism. The study indicates that not just from a democratic and civil liberties point of view, but also when it comes to making sure that citizens feel confident to go about their daily business freely, despite a threat from terrorism, it is necessary to think about counterterrorism in broad terms: Intelligence measures, law enforcement, protective security, and emergency management services cannot stand alone. Inclusiveness, fundamental freedoms, and a civil society willing and able to take responsibility are linked directly by the sample population to feelings of safety and security when being in a crowded place. Thus, the findings of our study might prompt the question whether we should begin to think about counterterrorism in even broader terms than has hitherto been the case even in well-balanced and comprehensive treatments of the topic.

It is frequently pointed out that one of the greatest dangers for a liberal democracy when it comes to responding to terrorism is to get caught up in a vicious cycle where politicians react to a perceived public demand for ''tough'' responses. And that such responses risk playing into the hands of the terrorists' propaganda, lead to societal polarization, and eat away at the liberties and fundamental principles of a liberal democracy.[47] Our findings further reinforce this point in the sense that they illustrate how, also when we look at the counterterrorism component of protective

security, the legitimacy of government institutions and citizens' trust in each other are crucial ingredients.[48]

What our findings further suggest is that the public is actually capable of being very nuanced and reflective about how to ensure public safety and security against security threats when the discussion is allowed to unfold and care is taken to avoid inducing a fear mode. The notion that if only the media would not be so sensationalist and if only politicians would not try to outbid each other in appearing tough on terrorism, then counterterrorism policies might become more balanced is certainly present in many discussions about counterterrorism. Our findings lend some empirical credence to these notions by showing that under favourable circumstances a democratic public will actually positively demand a broad and balanced range of counterterrorism measures and even place special emphasis on "softer" measures.

Notes

1. J. Coaffee, P. O'Hare, and M. Hawkesworth, "The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism," *Security Dialogue* 40, nos. 4–5 (2009): 489–511, 507; Michael Sorkin, "Introduction: The Fear Factor," in M. Sorkin, ed., *Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Insecurity State* (Abingdon, Oxon, England: Routledge, 2008), vii–xvii, viii and xiii.

2. A foundation working to make Denmark safer. See http://trygfonden.dk/Om-TrygFonden/In-English for more information.

3. Relation-Lab, which is now part of Implement Consulting Group, was chosen as the company had previously worked with issues and questions related to citizens' feelings of safety and security. Being aware that the involvement of a security and intelligence service could raise suspicion that the results of the study would be biased in the direction of arguing for more and broader security measures, the commissioning organizations took care to maintain an arms length from the research design, data collection, data processing, and analysis. Relation-Lab received short briefings by PET personnel on technical and tactical issues (blast-effects, mechanical and tactical security measures, attack methodology) and terminology (e.g., perimeter), but also carried out independent desk research before initiating the qualitative and quantitative data gathering. None of the commissioning organizations were involved with any of the data collection or processing. A scientific review board consisting of Professor Ole Wæver, University of Copenhagen, Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen, University of Aalborg, and former Chief Police Commissioner Hanne Bech Hansen was established to vouch for the scientific validity and reliability of the study, and for the independence of the results from any unwarranted interference from the commissioning organizations. The board convened three times during the research period (April through July 2011) to assess the research design, the methodology, the progress, and the results of the study. In addition, written material, including the draft final report, was circulated to and revised according to the directions and inputs of the board.

4. A. L. Fimreite, P. Lango, P. Lægreid, and L. H. Rykkja, "After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36 (2013): 839–856, 840; J. Wolfendale, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 753–770, 754.

5. O. Newman, *Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City* (London: Architectural Press, 1972), 4.

6. J. Bannister and N. Fyfe, "Introduction: Fear and the City," *Urban Studies* 38, nos. 5–6 (2001): 807–813, 811; J. Coaffee, C. Moore, D. Fletcher, and L. Bosher, "Resilient Design for Community Safety and Terror-Resistant Cities," *Municipal Engineer* 1 (June 2008): 103–110, 108; S. Flusty, "Building Paranoia," in N. Ellin, ed., *Architecture of Fear* (Princeton, NJ: Architectural Press, 1997), 47–59, 58.

7. Trevor Boddy, "Architecture Emblematic: Hardened Sites and Softened Symbols," in Sorkin, ed., *Indefensible Space* (see note 1 above), 277–300, 300.

8. P. Lauritsen, "Føler du dig tryg nu?" [Do You Feel Safe Now?], *Politiken*, January 29, 2010.

9. J. Coaffee, "Rings of Steel, Rings of Concrete and Rings of Confidence: Designing out Terrorism in Central London pre and post September 11th," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 28, no. 1 (2004): 201–211, 207; Also see Graeme Steven, "Terrorist Tactics and Counter-Terrorism," in Andrew Silke, ed., *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (Abingdon, Oxon, England: Routledge, 2011), 158–160.

10. Critical scholars conceive of themselves as an alternative to what they have termed "orthodox" terrorism studies. Orthodox studies, they argue, is at best blind to and at worst complicit in the use of terrorism studies to further specific, status-quo preserving notions and narratives about terrorism and counterterrorism: J. Gunning, "Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6 (2007): 236–243; John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, "A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies,'" *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008): 51–64; Richard Jackson, "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6 (2007): 244–251; L. Jarvis, "The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies," *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 1 (2009): 5–27.

11. Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, "The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies" (paper prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30–September 2), 21.

12. Marie Bree Smyth, Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, George Kassimeris, and Piers Robinson. "Critical Terrorism Studies—An Introduction," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008): 1–4, 1; Also see Anthony Richards, "Countering the Psychological Impact of Terrorism," in A. Silke, ed., *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (see note 9 above), 191; John Mueller, *Overblown* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

13. Z. Bauman. "At søge ly i Pandoras æske" [Seeking Shelter in Pandora's Box], *Dansk Sociologi* 16, no. 3 (2005): 66–77, 67.

14. J. Blackbourn, H. Dexter, R. Dhanda, and D. Miller. "Editor's Introduction: A Decade on from 11 September 2001: What Has Critical Terrorism Studies Learned?" *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5, no. 1 (2012): 1–10, 8; Smyth et al., "Critical Terrorism Studies—An Introduction" (see note 12 above), 2.

15. Coaffee et al., "The Visibility of (In)security" (see note 1 above), 507; J. Light, "Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26, no. 3 (2002): 607–613, 612; Sorkin, "Introduction: The Fear Factor" (see note 1 above), viii and xiii; P. Marcuse, "Security or Safety in Cities? The Threat of Terrorism after 9/11," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30, no. 4 (2006): 919–929, 920.

16. J. Peter Burgess, *The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe* (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2011), 131.

17. K. R. Grosskopf, "Evaluating the Societal Response to Antiterrorism Measures," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 3, no. 2 (2006): 1–9, 6 and 3; It should be noted, however, that the same measures, when presented as measures to counter ordinary crime, did not appear to induce fear. As pointed out by the authors themselves, it should further be noted that the sample, being mainly young, white, and male, is not representative and the results cannot necessarily be generalized to other groups (Grosskopf, 8).

18. Anne Aly and Lelia Green, "Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 3 (2010): 268–281, 277.

19. We are aware that the basic thrust of critical studies is not to produce empirical evidence and that the notion of "evidence" is problematized by the tradition: Horgan and Boyle, "A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'" (see note 10 above), 51; Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning, "Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies," in Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, eds., *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2009), 91. Yet, we are convinced that rigorous empirical research can contribute to explanations of social phenomena and, hopefully, in addition to informing policy and praxis—the primary aim of the Danish study—also contribute to the necessary debate between critical studies and other research traditions: Richard Jackson, "Symposium: The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 225–227, 227; Jackson, "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies" (see note 10 above), 246–247.

20. David F. Birks and Naresh K. Malhotra, *Marketing Research: An Applied Approach* (Spain: Prentice Hall, 2007), 212.

21. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) is part of the Danish National Police.

22. The Danish study included only security measures that are realistic in a Danish context unlike some of the security measures (e.g., the pictures of a razor wire fence, an armed guard, and an armed hooded guard with a dog baring its teeth) presented in the University of Florida study. Only the Danish police are armed in Denmark. Accordingly, the Danish study is not able to test the specific effect of armed guards. It should, though, be noted that the Florida study only showed increased anxiety in a terrorism context. It can thus be argued that it is a combination of factors and not just the armed guards that create the increased anxiety.

23. In addition, one might look to research and policy in the area of health policy. Fear appeals have been openly used in health education for many years. Research indicates that when people are exposed to fear-arousing communication, they tend to appraise both the communicated threat and their available coping strategy—the action recommendation—more positively than when non-fear-arousing communication is used: E. H. H. Das, J. B. F. de Wit, and W. Stroebe, "Fear Appeals Motivate Acceptance of Action Recommendations: Evidence for a Positive Bias in the Processing of Persuasive Messages," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 38 (2003): 115–134.

24. L. Rykkja, P. Lægreid, and A. L. Fimreite, "Attitudes towards Anti-Terror Measures: The Role of Trust, Political Orientation and Civil Liberties Support," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 2 (2010): 219–237, 227.

25. A seven-point Likert scale was used. A Likert scale is easily understood by respondents and thus suitable for Internet surveys: Birks and Malhotra, *Marketing Research* (see note 20 above), 348–350.

26. For the full set of statements and aggregated statements see Relation-Lab, *Sikkerhed og tryghed på befærdede steder* [Security and Safety in Crowded Places] (Relation-Lab A/S: Copenhagen, 2011), 60–64, https://www.pet.dk/Forebyggende%20sikkerhed/Samarbejde.aspx.

27. The respondents were also given the option to answer "Do not know."

28. Robust multivariate outlier detection and cluster analysis with FASTCLUS.

29. Philip Kotler and Kevin Lane Keller, *Marketing Management*, 12th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 19–20.

30. For the full set of statements and aggregated statements see Relation-Lab (note 26 above).

31. Utility (U) = Importance (I) x Performance Perception (P). The Importance Score was the aggregated score from the initial statements on a ten-point scale. The Performance Perception Score was rescaled from a seven-point scale to a −3 to +3 scale. The rescaling of the Performance Perception Score allowed the use of a negative utility score to indicate aggregated statements that were important to the respondents but which the respondents did not feel were fulfilled.

32. These four statements are aggregated from several statements about the presence of visible police, bomb-sniffing dogs, police dogs, uniformed guards and door men, metal detectors, special forces at major events, bollards, fences and more.

33. Jacob Andersen, Anders Hede, and Jørgen Gaul Andersen, *Danskernes hverdags-problemer, Tryghedsmåling 2013* [The Everyday Problems of the Danes] (Denmark: TrygFonden, 2013), 46; L. L. Funch, B. M. Hammann, and S. A. M. Munck, *Tegn på tryghed* [Signs of Safety] (Copenhagen: Den Trygge Kommune and European Institute for Risk Management, 2010); Odense Kommune, *Tryghedsbarometer 2012* [Safety Barometer 2012], 2012, 4, http://www.odense.dk/topmenu/borger/bymiljoe/bolig%20og%20byggeri/boligstrategisk%20indsats/~/media/BMF/Tryg%20By/Tryghedsbarometer%202012.ashx.

34. Burgess, *The Ethical Subject of Security* (see note 16 above), 131.

35. B. Fischhoff and J. Kadvany, *Risk: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 136; O. Renn, "Concepts of Risk: A Classification," in S. Krimsky and D. Golding, eds., *Social Theories of Risk* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 57.

36. George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown, "Patrol," in David H. Bayley, ed., *What Works in Policing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 30–50; Flemming Balvig and Lars Holmberg, *Politi & Tryghed, Forsøg med nærpoliti i Danmark* [Police and Safety, Research on Local Police in Denmark] (Holbæk: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2004), 161.

37. Fischhoff and Kadvany, *Risk* (see note 35 above), 133–134.

38. E. Zechmeister, D. Montalvo, and J. Merolla, "Citizen Fears of Terrorism in the Americas," *Americas Barometer Insights* 46 (2010): 2.

39. Marian Tulloch, "Quantitative Review," in J. Tulloch, D. Lupton, W. Blood, M. Tulloch, C. Jennett, and M. Enders, eds., *Fear of Crime: Audit of the Literature and Community Programs* (Barton: Criminology Research Council, National Campaign Against Violence and Crime, National Anti-Crime Strategy, 1998), 8–28, 19.

40. Bannister and Fyfe, "Introduction: Fear and the City" (see note 6 above), 809; J. Tulloch et al., eds., *Fear of Crime* (see note 39 above), 20.

41. See Funch, Hammann and Munck, *Tegn på tryghed* [Signs of Safety] (see note 33 above).

42. S. Krimsky, "Risk Communication in the Internet Age: The Rise of Disorganized Scepticism," *Environmental Hazards* 7 (2007): 157–164, 159.

43. Funch, Hammann and Munck, *Tegn på tryghed* [Signs of Safety] (see note 33 above), 33–34; Steven Van de Walle, Steven Van Roosbroek, and Geert Bouckaert, "Trust in the Public Sector: Is There Any Evidence for a Long-Term Decline?" *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 75 (2008): 47, 59; Jaime Diez Medrano, *Interpersonal Trust*, 2013, http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyMaps.jsp?Idioma=I&SeccionTexto=0404&-NOID=104; Finansministeriet, *Borgerne og den offentlige sector* [The Citizens and the Public Sector] (Denmark: Schultz, 1998), 91–98; Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, *Tillid* [Trust] (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2012), 17–18.

44. Rykkja, Lægreid, and Fimreite, "Attitudes towards Anti-Terror Measures" (see note 24 above), 230.

45. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of A Grand Strategy* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 15; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

46. Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (London: Transaction, 2005), xviii; Silke, ed., *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (see note 9 above), 4.

47. R. English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 119; A. Richards, "Countering the Psychological Impact of Terrorism: Challenges for Homeland Security," in Silke, ed., *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (see note 9 above), 197.

48. Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy* (see note 45 above), viii, 95.